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All the Perl that's Practical to Extract and Report

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  • I wonder if you're overestimating the scalability of IRC. You should look towards protocols like DNS which have the scalability issue solved (though lack in the real-time you are looking for).
    • In order for the concept to work at all, I need a decentralised, stateless, near-real-time and many-to-many communications system. Anything that fits this profile will suffice. Unfortunately, DNS doesn't. Any centralised system is subject to attack, both techical and legal. IRC _does_ meet the profile, although you are correct that it might not scale as far as I might like. But 10,000 members passing around 10,000,000 threat messages a day is a good start. I'm sure once we start to hit such limits, someon
  • How will you prevent hosts from maliciously reporting other, innocent hosts as miscreants?
    • Luckily, that isn't my problem. The problem of trust is one that each network operator will have to deal with.

      All I can do is to not mandate a particular solution, and instead to let evolution decide.

      On my company-internal ThreatNet, I simple have the server only allow connections from IPs inside my network.

      On a commercial one, perhaps we use SIRC, passworded accounts and certificates to verify validated users.

      I imagine there are a number of different solutions to the trust problem.